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Abstract
Currently, there are enormous Risk Factors (RFs) threating the safety of Oil and Gas Pipelines (OGPs) at all stages of projects. 
However, there is a lack of information about the root causes of pipeline failures and an absence of trusted data about the "probability 
and severity" levels of the RFs; this hinders the risk management in such projects. To improve the safety level of OGPs, this paper aims to 
explore stakeholders' perceptions about pipeline failures issues to analyze the RFs and recommend effective Risk Mitigation Methods 
(RMMs). Due to the lack of trusted data about the RFs and RMMs, this paper started with extensive investigations to identify the critical 
RFs and the applied RMMs in OGP projects in different circumstances. The findings of these investigations were used to design 
a questionnaire survey, which was distributed to analyze the "probability and severity" levels of the RFs and evaluate the "usability and 
effectiveness" degrees of the suggested RMMs. The survey results revealed that RFs related to Third-Party Disruption (TPD) including 
sabotage and terrorism, corruption and insecure areas are the most severe RFs. Additionally, based on the survey some RMMs such as 
anti-corrosion efforts, laying the pipelines underground and using technologically advanced risk-monitoring systems were found to be 
effective RMMs. These results were found to be varied based on the stakeholders' occupation in the projects; for example, the overall 
survey results indicated that terrorism and sabotage is the most critical RF, while the planners and the researchers identified corruption 
as the most critical one. It was also observed that using anti-corrosion measures such as isolation and cathodic protection would be 
the most effective RMM, while the other stakeholders have different perceptions like moving the pipelines underground an advanced 
risk-monitoring system are the most effective RMMs as indicated by the consultant, planner or designer and researches respectively.
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1 Introduction
Oil and Gas Pipeline (OGP) projects must be planned, 
designed, installed and operated in ways that comply 
with the safety requirements. However, several risks are 
hindering the safety of these projects such as external sab-
otage, corrosion (Miesner and Leffler, 2006), design and 
construction defects, natural hazards, operational errors 
and others (Focke, 2009; Wan and Mita, 2010; Williamson 
and Daniels, 2008). Knowing how to mitigate OGP RFs 
is valuable because it minimizes the economic losses 
from disturbing the business of oil exporting; additionally, 
it ensures the safety of the projects' staff and the people 
that live near the pipelines.
Efforts to mitigate OGP RFs actively require verified his-
torical records about the reasons for the pipelines' accidents 
and failure (Srivastava and Gupta, 2010). Moreover, the 
probability of RFs must be accurately analyzed and ranked 
because dealing with each RF as the most severe risk results 
in a waste of resources. However, the existing risk analy-
sis methods are not accurate enough to analyze the external 
sabotage of the pipelines when there is no database of "his-
torical records" about such risk (Ge et al., 2015; Khakzad 
et al., 2011; Peng et al., 2016). Additionally, an accurate eval-
uation of the Risk Mitigation Methods (RMMs) regarding 
their degrees of effectiveness of mitigating the RFs helps 
the decision makers while they are deciding their strategies 
to mitigate OGP RFs. Accordingly, the inaccurate analyses 
of OGP RFs and inaccurate evaluation of the RMMs are hin-
dering any risk mitigation efforts in these projects. This is 
particularly the case in troubled and developing countries 
because these highlighted problems are strongly associated 
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with OGP projects in these countries. Hence, there is a vital 
need to help the stakeholders to improve safety for these 
projects by providing the required data for OGP risk man-
agement such as the "probability and severity" levels of 
the RFs and the "usability and effectiveness" of the RMMs.
This paper aims to explore stakeholders' perceptions 
about pipeline failures issues to analyze the RFs and eval-
uate the RMMs in OGP projects more holistically and 
effectively. Moreover, having up-to-date data about the 
RFs and RMMs can help the stakeholders to improve 
the safety of OGPs continuously.
Iraq is selected as the case study in this paper because 
its oil reserves are the fifth largest in the world (Energy 
Information Administration, 2015). Furthermore, it is esti-
mated that Iraq's gas reserves are amongst the 10th to 13th 
largest reserves globally, in addition to the possibility that 
there is a vast number of reserves that are yet undiscov-
ered (International Energy Agency, 2012). At the present 
time, a vast range of RFs threatens OGP projects in Iraq 
and the inadequacy of mitigating the RFs hinders the busi-
ness of oil exporting, which has been in high demand since 
2003. Moving forward in this paper, Section 2 consists 
of a review about identifying pipeline RFs and RMMs. 
Section 3 explains the research methodology. The results 
of analyzing the RFS and evaluating the RMMs are inter-
preted in Section 4. Section 5 discusses this paper's find-
ings. Finally, Section 6 provides the conclusions.
2 Identifying the Risk Factors (RFs) and Risk 
Mitigation Methods (RMMs) in OGP Projects 
Qualitative document analysis was carried out to identify 
the RFs in OGP projects in different circumstances, espe-
cially in insecure countries. Thirty RFs were identified 
based on the findings of the literature review, as follows: 
• public's legal and moral awareness about OGP projects, 
vehicle accidents and lawlessness (Peng et al., 2016)
• thieves, terrorism and sabotage, people's poverty and 
education levels in OGP areas, improper inspection 
& maintenance, limited warning signs, corruption, 
little research about this topic, lack of proper train-
ing, operational errors, stakeholders are not paying 
proper attention, lack of risk registration, weather 
conditions and natural disasters, inadequate risk 
management approaches, weak ability to identify & 
monitor the threats, corrosion and lack of anti-cor-
rosive action, and shortage of IT services & modern 
equipment (Nnadi et al., 2014) 
• leakage of sensitive information (Wu et al., 2015), 
threats to staff and the opportunity to sabotage exposed 
pipelines – "aboveground pipelines" (Rowland, 2010) 
• insecure areas, hacker attacks on the operating or 
control systems and the pipeline is easy to access 
(Srivastava and Gupta, 2010) 
• conflict over land ownership (Macdonald and 
Cosham, 2005) and animal accidents (Mubin and 
Mubin, 2008) 
• geological risks, improper safety regulations 
and design, construction and material defects 
(Guo et al., 2016).
Accordingly, a number of RMMs were suggested to 
mitigate RFs like anti-corrosion and cathodic protection; 
laying the pipelines underground rather than aboveground; 
modern equipment to monitor the RFs; proper inspection 
and maintenance; proper training for the staff about mit-
igating the RFs in their projects; avoiding insecure areas; 
anti-terrorism planning and design; learn from the past 
and avoid the RFs that have been registered as causes 
of pipeline failure; protective barriers; government-pub-
lic cooperation; and warning signs near the pipelines and 
marker tape above the pipelines.
This analysis helped to overcome the problem of data 
scarcity about the RFs and RMMs in OGP projects in Iraq. 
However, more information is needed about the "probabil-
ity and severity" of the RFs and the "usability and effec-
tiveness" degrees of the suggested RMMs in OGP proj-
ects. In the meanwhile, no available database provides 
such data. The stakeholders must be aware of the RFs that 
can damage OGPs. Therefore, their perceptions are a valu-
able source for this study as they are based on experiences 
from the field. In addition, they must also have a risk mit-
igation system that can keep the RFs at the lowest level, 
as far as possible. Moreover, collecting such perceptions 
could reduce the time and cost of investigations into the 
RFs and RMMs by meeting those who are responsible 
for risk management. Therefore, field investigations were 
required to analyze the situation of OGP safety in Iraq 
by distributing a questionnaire survey. The survey was 
distributed online and it targeted the owners and clients, 
researchers and students, consultants, planners and design-
ers, construction team members, and operators in Iraq's 
OGP projects. There are many studies about assessing RFs 
in OGPs by conducting questionnaire surveys, interviews 
and ascertaining experts' judgements, like (Guo et al., 2016; 
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Rowland, 2010; Wu et al., 2015), yet such studies have not 
analyzed the RFs based on the stakeholders' roles in the proj-
ects. However, understanding the stakeholders' perceptions 
based on their experience is more important than just gain-
ing their perception of OGPs because different groups of 
stakeholders might have different views about pipeline fail-
ure, which reflects their roles in the projects. Different per-
ceptions provide a better understanding about the RFs and 
RMMs in different stages of the projects from the staff 
who are working at these stages. Furthermore, they provide 
a chance to explore the perceptions of everyone concerned 
with OGPs even if they do not work directly in such proj-
ects, such as the researchers. Therefore, correct sampling 
and representing all of the stakeholder categories enhances 
the results of this paper.
3 Methodology 
An industry-wide questionnaire survey was designed 
based on the findings of the literature review to collect 
the perceptions of the stakeholders about OGPs in Iraq. 
The respondents were promised that the data would be 
analyzed in a way that protected their anonymity.
The first question asked about their occupation in OGP 
projects. The survey had two questions to analyze the RFs, 
as follows. The first question aimed to analyze the prob-
ability of occurrence of the 30 RFs on a five-point Likert 
scale: "rare", "unlikely", "possible", "likely" and "almost 
certain". The second question aimed to evaluate the sever-
ity of the RFs on a scale of "negligible", "minor", "moder-
ate", "major" and "catastrophic". Similarly, the survey had 
two questions to evaluate the RMMs, as follows. The first 
question asked about evaluating the usability of the RMMs 
on a scale of "rare", "unlikely", "possible", "likely" and 
"almost certain". The second question was about evalu-
ating the effectiveness of the RMMs on a scale of "inef-
fective", "slightly effective", "moderately effective", "very 
effective" and "extremely effective".
The descriptive statistical analysis in Statistical Package 
for the Social Sciences (SPSS) software was used to deter-
mine the values of Risk Probability (RP) and Risk Severity 
(RS) for each RF by calculating the mean of the five-point 
Likert scales. The degree of impact for each RF was found 
by using a Risk Index (RI) method as explained in Eq. (1) 
(Yazdani-Chamzini, 2014). The RFs were ranked regard-
ing their RI values. In the same way, the usability and 
the effectiveness of the RMMs were found.
RI RP RS= ×( ) 5     (1)
4 Results 
Before analyzing the results, the Cronbach's alpha cor-
relation coefficient factor was calculated to measure 
the reliability level of the survey (Cronbach, 1951; Webb 
et al., 2006). Commonly, 0.7 indicates a minimum level of 
reliability (Pallant, 2005). Table 1 shows the Cronbach's 
alpha coefficient factor case processing summary. The reli-
ability test is not applicable for question 1 because it asked 
about the participants' occupation in OGP projects.
One hundred and ninety-eight stakeholders answered 
the survey's questions. It is worth noting that all the tar-
geted groups are represented in the results, which means 
the results reflect the issues faced by OGPs during all 
stages of a project as explained at the end of Section 0. 
The majority of the participants were construction team 
members (71), followed by the operators (41), owners 
or clients (39), researchers or students (33), and, finally, 
the consultants, planners and designers (14).
In order to link the stakeholders' perceptions and the RFs 
and RMMs, the RFs and RMMs were analyzed based on 
stakeholders' occupations in OGP projects in Iraq. Table 2 
shows the results of calculating the RP and RS of each RF. 
Table 3 shows the ranking of the RFs based on their RI val-
ues. The usability and effectiveness of the RMMs are shown 
in Table 4. Note, in these tables Total means all the partic-
ipants; (I) means the consultants, planners and designers; 
(II) means the construction workers; (III) means the oper-
ators; (IV) means the owners and clients; and (V) means 
the researchers. The discussion section focuses on stake-
holders, the reasons for the variances and similarities in the 
results, and the lessons that can be learned from them.
Table 1 Cronbach's alpha coefficient factor case processing summary 
for the survey overall and by participants' occupation.
Case Processing Summary Valid % Items α
All the questionnaire's questions 100 95 0.910
The question about RP (survey overall) 100 30 0.919
The question about RS (survey overall) 100 30 0.863
The question about the usability of 
RMMs (survey overall)
100 12 0.867
The question about the effectiveness of 
RMMs (survey overall)
100 12 0.867
A consultant, planner or designer 100 95 0.863
A member of a construction team 100 95 0.892
An operator 100 95 0.927
An owner or client 100 95 0.917
A researcher or student 100 95 0.899
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Table 2 The probability and severity of the risk factors by participants' occupation.
RFs
Risk Probability (RP) Risk Severity (RS)
Total I II III IV V Total I II III IV V
Terrorism & sabotage 3.995 3.357 3.958 4.195 4.000 4.091 4.490 3.571 3.732 3.829 3.718 3.939
Corruption 3.980 4.000 3.986 3.878 3.846 4.242 4.192 3.286 3.732 3.512 3.769 3.939
Insecure areas 3.717 3.286 3.634 3.805 3.769 3.909 4.106 3.286 3.634 3.659 4.000 3.606
Low public legal & moral awareness 3.712 4.000 3.761 3.561 3.513 3.909 3.859 3.357 3.535 3.244 3.590 3.727
Thieves 3.692 3.214 3.845 3.659 3.564 3.758 4.081 3.000 3.662 3.585 3.846 3.818
Corrosion & lack of protection against it 3.687 3.429 3.648 3.390 3.795 4.121 3.990 3.357 3.676 3.683 3.641 3.697
Improper safety regulations 3.687 3.643 3.662 3.561 3.872 3.697 3.949 3.214 3.592 3.488 3.872 3.667
Exposed pipelines 3.667 3.429 3.437 3.854 3.897 3.758 3.682 2.500 3.042 2.951 3.000 3.000
Shortage of IT services & modern 
equipment 3.667 3.643 3.592 3.585 3.615 4.000 3.652 1.714 2.155 1.951 2.000 1.970
Improper inspection & maintenance 3.657 3.571 3.606 3.537 3.769 3.818 3.924 3.357 3.746 3.610 3.641 3.394
Lack of proper training 3.646 3.571 3.761 3.439 3.462 3.909 3.773 3.500 3.408 3.098 3.410 3.697
Weak ability to identify & monitor 
the threats 3.631 3.571 3.577 3.561 3.692 3.788 3.899 3.000 3.690 3.488 3.487 3.758
The pipeline is easy to access 3.631 3.571 3.563 3.732 3.538 3.788 3.646 3.571 3.732 3.829 3.718 3.939
Limited warning signs 3.626 3.429 3.648 3.341 3.974 3.606 3.571 3.286 3.634 3.659 4.000 3.606
Little research on this topic 3.621 3.429 3.789 3.366 3.359 3.970 3.697 2.857 3.042 2.854 3.077 3.455
Lawlessness 3.606 3.786 3.676 3.268 3.795 3.576 3.682 2.500 3.042 2.951 3.000 3.000
Lack of risk registration 3.566 3.214 3.606 3.390 3.615 3.788 3.697 2.857 3.042 2.854 3.077 3.455
Stakeholders are not paying proper 
attention 3.530 3.286 3.676 3.439 3.462 3.960 3.143 3.577 3.829 3.692 3.727 3.960
Conflicts over land ownership 3.495 3.571 3.451 3.659 3.667 3.152 3.611 3.286 3.732 3.512 3.769 3.939
Public's poverty & education level 3.449 3.357 3.521 3.439 3.256 3.576 3.409 3.357 3.676 3.683 3.641 3.697
Design, construction & material defects 3.333 2.429 3.254 3.293 3.385 3.879 3.848 3.571 3.549 3.390 3.179 3.333
Threats to staff  3.323 2.714 3.394 3.268 3.410 3.394 3.399 3.143 3.577 3.829 3.692 3.727
Inadequate risk management 3.227 2.929 3.183 2.976 3.436 3.515 3.505 3.000 3.662 3.585 3.846 3.818
Operational errors 3.101 2.857 3.042 2.878 3.205 3.485 3.611 3.500 3.958 3.537 3.692 3.636
Leakage of sensitive information 2.980 2.643 3.070 2.707 2.949 3.303 3.505 3.000 3.662 3.585 3.846 3.818
Geological risks 2.747 2.714 2.662 2.537 2.795 3.152 3.182 3.214 3.592 3.488 3.872 3.667
Natural disasters & weather conditions 2.652 2.429 2.606 2.537 2.692 2.939 3.066 3.357 3.746 3.610 3.641 3.394
Vehicle accidents 2.465 2.357 2.380 2.293 2.333 3.061 2.712 3.357 3.535 3.244 3.590 3.727
Hacker attacks on the operating or 
control system 2.237 1.929 2.268 2.024 2.179 2.636 2.970 3.000 3.690 3.488 3.487 3.758
Animal accidents 1.894 1.929 1.986 1.561 1.821 2.182 2.020 3.571 3.549 3.390 3.179 3.333
5 Discussion
By using the RI to rank the RFs, the overall results of 
the survey show that terrorism and sabotage, corruption, 
insecure areas, lawlessness and thefts are the most critical 
RFs in OGP projects in Iraq. Nevertheless, the ranking of 
the RFs is quite varied, depending on the occupations of 
the stakeholders. If we look to the ranking per the stake-
holder groups, for example, three groups (construction 
workers, operators, and owners and clients) ranked terror-
ism and sabotage actions first, whilst the consultants, plan-
ners and designers group ranked it third and the academic 
group ranked it second, with both of these groups ranking 
corruption first. If we look at Table 3 by RF, for example, 
three groups (construction workers, operators, and owners 
and clients) ranked terrorism and sabotage actions first, 
while the consultants, planners and designers group ranked 
it third and the academic group ranked it second, with both 
of these groups ranking corruption first. The construction 
workers and owners and clients ranked corruption sec-
ond; while the operators ranked it third. The consultants, 
planners and designers, construction workers and own-
ers and clients ranked the insecure areas seventh; while 
it was ranked second and fourth from the operators' and 
researchers' point of view respectively. Lawlessness was 
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Table 3 The index and ranking of the risk factors by participants' occupation.
RFs
Risk Index (RI) Ranking the RFs
Total I II III IV V Total I II III IV V
Terrorism & sabotage 3.587* 3.021 3.579 3.909 3.405 3.669 1 3 1 1 1 2
Corruption 3.441 3.314 3.537 3.254 3.314 3.677 2 1 2 3 2 1
Insecure areas 3.053 2.722 2.928 3.267 3.035 3.222 3 7 7 2 7 4
Lawlessness 3.023 2.812 3.210 2.583 3.211 3.056 4 4 3 16 3 9
Thieves 3.013 2.388 3.206 2.998 2.906 3.029 5 15 4 4 10 11
Corrosion & lack of protection against it 2.942 2.498 2.918 2.696 3.172 3.222 6 11 8 10 4 3
Improper safety regulations 2.912 2.810 2.899 2.797 2.958 3.070 7 5 9 9 9 8
Improper inspection & maintenance 2.870 2.755 2.742 2.829 3.015 3.078 8 6 13 7 8 7
Public's legal and moral awareness 2.865 3.086 2.934 2.588 2.738 3.127 9 2 6 14 13 5
Weak ability to identify & monitor the threats 2.832 2.551 2.802 2.831 2.878 2.961 10 10 11 6 11 14
Stakeholders are not paying proper attention 2.796 2.629 2.972 2.583 2.716 2.855 11 8 5 15 15 16
Lack of proper training 2.751 2.551 2.807 2.634 2.574 3.080 12 9 10 13 19 6
Exposed pipelines 2.700 2.253 2.498 2.820 3.118 2.710 13 16 21 8 5 19
Shortage of IT services & modern equipment 2.678 2.446 2.641 2.641 2.633 2.958 14 12 17 12 17 15
Limited warning signs 2.656 2.057 2.672 2.396 3.057 2.754 15 20 16 18 6 18
The pipeline is easy to access 2.648 2.245 2.550 2.858 2.613 2.824 16 17 19 5 18 17
Lack of risk registration 2.636 2.112 2.692 2.381 2.725 2.984 17 18 14 19 14 12
Little research on this topic 2.586 2.057 2.796 2.348 2.343 2.983 18 19 12 20 23 13
Design, construction & material defects 2.566 1.839 2.410 2.538 2.760 3.033 19 23 22 17 12 10
Conflicts over land ownership 2.524 2.398 2.586 2.641 2.670 2.139 20 14 18 11 16 26
Threats to staff 2.481 1.900 2.687 2.312 2.518 2.468 21 22 15 22 20 22
The education and poverty levels in OGP areas 2.352 2.398 2.500 2.332 2.071 2.384 22 13 20 21 25 24
Operational errors 2.240 1.837 2.185 2.008 2.482 2.556 23 24 23 23 21 21
Inadequate risk management 2.194 2.050 2.170 1.843 2.343 2.599 24 21 25 24 22 20
Leakage of sensitive information 2.089 1.774 2.171 1.756 2.117 2.462 25 25 24 25 24 23
Geological risks 1.748 1.551 1.605 1.670 1.749 2.273 26 26 26 26 26 25
Natural disasters & weather conditions 1.626 1.388 1.585 1.448 1.657 2.031 27 27 27 27 27 27
Vehicle accidents 1.337 1.010 1.274 1.275 1.328 1.707 28 28 29 28 28 28
Hacker attacks on the operating or control 
system 1.329 0.964 1.380 1.195 1.308 1.582 29 29 28 29 29 29
Animal accidents 0.765 0.661 0.856 0.609 0.728 0.860 30 30 30 30 30 30
*For example: RI for Terrorism & sabotage = (RP) 3.995 × (RS) 4.490 = (RI) 3.587
ranked third based on construction workers' and owners 
and clients' perceptions. It ranked fourth, ninth and 16th 
regarding consultants, planners and designers', research-
ers' and operators' perceptions respectively. Thefts were 
ranked fourth by both the construction workers and oper-
ators, 10th by owners and clients, 11th by researchers and 
15th by consultants, planners and designers. Regarding the 
less influential RFs, researchers ranked the leakage of sen-
sitive information 23rd; construction workers and owners 
and clients ranked it 24th; and the consultants, planners and 
designers and operators ranked it 25th. All the stakehold-
ers ranked the geological risk 26th, apart from research-
ers, who ranked it 25th. All the stakeholders ranked natural 
disasters and weather conditions 27th and vehicle acci-
dents 28th, apart from construction workers, who ranked 
vehicle accidents 29th. The ranking of RFs indicated that 
the hacker attack on the operating or control system and 
animal accidents were ranked 29th and 30th respectively. 
Only the construction worker group ranked hacker attack 
on the operating system differently, at 28th.
At the same time, to highlight the top five RFs by each 
group of stakeholders, it is worth noting that the pub-
lic's legal and moral awareness was second-highest and 
RF from the consultants, planners and designers' point 
of view. Corrosion & lack of protection against it was 
the fourth RF according to owners and clients. Other RFs 
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Table 4 The usability and effectiveness degree of each RMM by participants' occupation.
RMMs
Usability Effectiveness
Total I II III IV V Total I II III IV V
Avoid "Insecure Zones" 3.652 2.929 3.789 3.829 3.385 3.758 3.778 3.214 4.014 3.659 3.744 3.697
Anti-terrorism design 3.475 2.643 3.676 3.268 3.564 3.545 3.778 3.143 3.986 3.341 4.179 3.667
Avoid the registered risks and threats 3.616 3.357 3.662 3.634 3.513 3.727 3.773 3.500 3.817 3.683 4.000 3.636
Proper training 3.768 3.643 3.634 3.854 3.769 4.000 3.793 3.857 3.662 3.780 3.897 3.939
Move to an underground pipeline 4.051 3.857 4.085 4.390 3.846 3.879 4.066 3.929 4.000 4.220 4.333 3.758
Anti-corrosion measures such as 
isolation and cathodic protection 4.247 4.000 4.282 4.512 4.103 4.121 4.232 3.857 4.113 4.415 4.513 4.091
Protective barriers and perimeter 
fencing 3.783 3.214 3.732 3.878 3.872 3.909 3.773 3.500 3.817 3.683 4.000 3.636
Warning signs and marker tape 
above the pipeline 3.727 3.143 3.732 3.683 3.846 3.879 3.571 2.929 3.577 3.439 3.923 3.576
Foot and vehicle patrols 3.606 3.143 3.648 3.683 3.590 3.636 3.530 3.429 3.563 3.634 3.615 3.273
High technology and professional 
remote monitoring 3.480 2.643 3.606 3.415 3.359 3.788 3.995 3.643 4.070 3.878 4.000 4.121
Government-public cooperation 3.278 3.000 3.183 3.463 3.205 3.455 3.545 3.214 3.563 3.561 3.564 3.606
Proper inspection, tests and 
maintenance 3.677 3.429 3.549 3.805 3.769 3.788 3.828 3.429 3.887 3.829 3.872 3.818
like improper safety regulations, stakeholders are not pay-
ing proper attention, exposed pipelines and public's legal 
and moral awareness were the fifth RFs according to con-
sultants, planners and designers, construction workers, 
owners and clients and researchers.
Form the previous discussion it is obvious that the rank-
ing of the RFs is significantly influenced by the occupations 
of the stakeholders in OGP projects. The staff who are work-
ing on-site considered terrorism and sabotage as the most 
severe RF. This consideration might be because they are the 
people who are suffering from these threats directly; while 
this kind of risk is only threatening other staff like consul-
tants, planners and designers, and researchers in an indirect 
way, as these people are office-based workers and might 
not work at the site. Thus, the staff who are working on-site 
see that terrorism and sabotage is the RF that has the most 
effect. However, office-based staff (i.e. consultants, plan-
ners and designers, and researchers) considered corruption 
to be the most severe RF, as these people are usually check-
ing the work procedures (e.g. welding) and the quality of the 
final work. This might give them a chance to compare the 
designs and work procedures on paper with the real work 
being carried out at the project site. If they identify a dif-
ference between the project on paper and on-site, they may 
conclude that the final check and acceptance of the work 
has been affected by some kind of corruption; so they are 
the ones who perceive that corruption is the RF that has 
the most effect.
The RMMs were evaluated by their degree of usability, 
which means which of the RMMs has the highest chance 
of being used to mitigate the RFs in OGP projects in Iraq 
based on the stakeholders' perceptions. The overall results 
of the survey indicate anti-corrosion measures such as iso-
lation and cathodic protection, moving to an underground 
pipeline, and protective barriers and perimeter fencing are 
the RMMs with the highest chance of being used in OGP 
projects in Iraq. The stakeholders have a similar point of 
view, which is that anti-corrosion measures such as isola-
tion and cathodic protection is the RMM with the highest 
chance of usability. The second highest RMM, according to 
the planners, consultants and designers, construction mem-
bers and operators, is moving the pipelines underground. 
However, this method was only third highest for owners 
and clients. Protective barriers and perimeter fencing was 
the method with the second-highest chance of usability 
according to owners and clients, and third highest accord-
ing to operators and researchers. Proper training was sec-
ond highest for researchers, and third for consultants, plan-
ners and designers; while avoiding "Insecure Zones" was 
third highest according to construction members.
The result of evaluating the effectiveness of the RMMs 
shows that anti-corrosion measures such as isolation and 
cathodic protection, moving to an underground pipeline, 
and the use of high technology and professional remote 
monitoring are the most effective RMMs. The RMM 
anti-corrosion measures such as isolation and cathodic 
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protection is the most effective RMM based on the per-
ceptions from construction team members, operators, and 
owners and clients; while this method is the second most 
effective according to consultants, planners and design-
ers and researchers. Laying the pipelines underground 
is the most effective RMM for consultants, planners and 
designers; while this method is the second most effective 
according to operators and owners and clients. Using high 
technology and professional remote monitoring is 
the most effective RMM according to researchers, the sec-
ond for construction workers and the third for consultants, 
planners and designers and operators. Proper training to 
mitigate the RFs is the third most effective RMM accord-
ing to consultants, planners and designers and researchers. 
Meanwhile, the third most effective RMMs for construc-
tion workers and owners and clients were avoiding inse-
cure areas and anti-terrorism design.
Even though the overall results indicated that anti-cor-
rosion measures and laying the pipelines underground are 
the RMMs with the highest rate of usability chance and 
the most effective methods, the stakeholders' jobs in OGP 
projects might affect their evaluation of the RMMs. 
This can be seen in some examples: consultants, plan-
ners and designers said that training the staff is the RMM 
with the highest rate of usability to mitigate the RFs. 
However; the construction teams and operators said 
avoiding insecure areas and having protective barriers and 
perimeter fencing are the methods with the highest rate 
of usability and effectiveness, as they are facing the risk 
of terrorism and sabotage directly. In addition, using high 
technology and professional remote monitoring was eval-
uated as an effective RMM because such methods could 
cover wide areas in less time (compared to foot and/or 
vehicle patrols) to identify any threats to the pipelines.
The survey results were found to be reliable as all 
Cronbach's alpha coefficient factor values were above 0.7, 
as explained in Table 1. Collecting the required informa-
tion from various and trusted sources such as research arti-
cles and stakeholders provides real information for OGP 
risk management. However, it depends on the availability of 
such documents and the willingness of the stakeholders to 
cooperate with the authors. Analyzing the RFs and evaluat-
ing the RMMs based on the perceptions of the stakeholders 
could reduce the time and the cost of the investigations and 
increase the stakeholders' awareness about their responsibil-
ities regarding OGP risk management. Additionally, it helps 
to analyze OGP RFs more realistically and to identify 
the positive and negative recommendations about RMMs 
in a way that ensures the continuity of pipeline security. 
This is because the stakeholders' perceptions are based on 
real experience about OGP issues. Furthermore, correct 
sampling and representing all the stakeholder categories 
enhances the results of RF analysis and RMM evaluation.
6 Conclusion
There is a need for an accurate analysis of OGP RFs 
because the safe RFs have not been accurately analyzed yet. 
The overall results of the survey showed that the external 
risk factors like terrorism and sabotage, corruption, inse-
cure areas, lawlessness and thieves were found to be the most 
critical risks in OGP projects in Iraq. Avoiding "Insecure 
Zones", having a good anti-terrorism design, and avoiding 
the registered risks and threats were found to be the most 
usable risk mitigation methods. Meanwhile, anti-corro-
sion measures such as isolation and cathodic protection, 
moving to an underground pipeline, and high technology 
and professional remote monitoring were the most effec-
tive risk mitigation methods. However, OGP stakeholders 
had different perceptions about this ranking, based on their 
occupation. This is because, as the OGPs are subject to dif-
ferent RFs during a project's stages, the views of the staff 
who are working on these stages could reflect this fact. 
Collecting and understanding these perceptions helped to 
provide the essential data for OGP risk management, along 
with a comprehensive and accurate analysis of the RFs and 
effective analysis of RMMs.
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